實(shí)踐論
論認(rèn)識(shí)和實(shí)踐的關(guān)系——知和行的關(guān)系
毛澤東
（一九三七年七月）
馬克思以前的唯物論，離開(kāi)人的社會(huì)性，離開(kāi)人的歷史發(fā)展，去觀(guān)察認(rèn)識(shí)問(wèn)題，因此不能了解認(rèn)識(shí)對(duì)社會(huì)實(shí)踐的依賴(lài)關(guān)系，即認(rèn)識(shí)對(duì)生產(chǎn)和階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)的依賴(lài)關(guān)系。
首先，馬克思主義者認(rèn)為人類(lèi)的生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)是最基本的實(shí)踐活動(dòng)，是決定其他一切活動(dòng)的東西。人的認(rèn)識(shí)，主要地依賴(lài)于物質(zhì)的生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)，逐漸地了解自然的現(xiàn)象、自然的性質(zhì)、自然的規(guī)律性、人和自然的關(guān)系；而且經(jīng)過(guò)生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)，也在各種不同程度上逐漸地認(rèn)識(shí)了人和人的一定的相互關(guān)系。一切這些知識(shí)，離開(kāi)生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)是不能得到的。在沒(méi)有階級(jí)的社會(huì)中，每個(gè)人以社會(huì)一員的資格，同其他社會(huì)成員協(xié)力，結(jié)成一定的生產(chǎn)關(guān)系，從事生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)，以解決人類(lèi)物質(zhì)生活問(wèn)題。在各種階級(jí)的社會(huì)中，各階級(jí)的社會(huì)成員，則又以各種不同的方式，結(jié)成一定的生產(chǎn)關(guān)系，從事生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)，以解決人類(lèi)物質(zhì)生活問(wèn)題。這是人的認(rèn)識(shí)發(fā)展的基本來(lái)源。
人的社會(huì)實(shí)踐，不限于生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)一種形式，還有多種其他的形式，階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)，政治生活，科學(xué)和藝術(shù)的活動(dòng)，總之社會(huì)實(shí)際生活的一切領(lǐng)域都是社會(huì)的人所參加的。因此，人的認(rèn)識(shí)，在物質(zhì)生活以外，還從政治生活文化生活中（與物質(zhì)生活密切聯(lián)系），在各種不同程度上，知道人和人的各種關(guān)系。其中，尤以各種形式的階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)，給予人的認(rèn)識(shí)發(fā)展以深刻的影響。在階級(jí)社會(huì)中，每一個(gè)人都在一定的階級(jí)地位中生活，各種思想無(wú)不打上階級(jí)的烙印。
馬克思主義者認(rèn)為人類(lèi)社會(huì)的生產(chǎn)活動(dòng)，是一步又一步地由低級(jí)向高級(jí)發(fā)展，因此，人們的認(rèn)識(shí)，不論對(duì)于自然界方面，對(duì)于社會(huì)方面，也都是一步又一步地由低級(jí)向高級(jí)發(fā)展，即由淺入深，由片面到更多的方面。在很長(zhǎng)的歷史時(shí)期內(nèi)，大家對(duì)于社會(huì)的歷史只能限于片面的了解，這一方面是由于剝削階級(jí)的偏見(jiàn)經(jīng)常歪曲社會(huì)的歷史，另方面，則由于生產(chǎn)規(guī)模的狹小，限制了人們的眼界。人們能夠?qū)τ谏鐣?huì)歷史的發(fā)展作全面的歷史的了解，把對(duì)于社會(huì)的認(rèn)識(shí)變成了科學(xué)，這只是到了伴隨巨大生產(chǎn)力——大工業(yè)而出現(xiàn)近代無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)的時(shí)候，這就是馬克思主義的科學(xué)。
馬克思主義者認(rèn)為，只有人們的社會(huì)實(shí)踐，才是人們對(duì)于外界認(rèn)識(shí)的真理性的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。實(shí)際的情形是這樣的，只有在社會(huì)實(shí)踐過(guò)程中（物質(zhì)生產(chǎn)過(guò)程中，階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)過(guò)程中，科學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)過(guò)程中），人們達(dá)到了思想中所預(yù)想的結(jié)果時(shí)，人們的認(rèn)識(shí)才被證實(shí)了。人們要想得到工作的勝利即得到預(yù)想的結(jié)果，一定要使自己的思想合于客觀(guān)外界的規(guī)律性，如果不合，就會(huì)在實(shí)踐中失敗。人們經(jīng)過(guò)失敗之后，也就從失敗取得教訓(xùn)，改正自己的思想使之適合于外界的規(guī)律性，人們就能變失敗為勝利，所謂“失敗者成功之母”，“吃一塹長(zhǎng)一智”，就是這個(gè)道理。辯證唯物論的認(rèn)識(shí)論把實(shí)踐提到第一的地位，認(rèn)為人的認(rèn)識(shí)一點(diǎn)也不能離開(kāi)實(shí)踐，排斥一切否認(rèn)實(shí)踐重要性、使認(rèn)識(shí)離開(kāi)實(shí)踐的錯(cuò)誤理論。列寧這樣說(shuō)過(guò)：“實(shí)踐高于（理論的）認(rèn)識(shí)，因?yàn)樗坏衅毡樾缘钠犯瘢疫€有直接現(xiàn)實(shí)性的品格。”⑴馬克思主義的哲學(xué)辯證唯物論有兩個(gè)最顯著的特點(diǎn)：一個(gè)是它的階級(jí)性，公然申明辯證唯物論是為無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)服務(wù)的；再一個(gè)是它的實(shí)踐性，強(qiáng)調(diào)理論對(duì)于實(shí)踐的依賴(lài)關(guān)系，理論的基礎(chǔ)是實(shí)踐，又轉(zhuǎn)過(guò)來(lái)為實(shí)踐服務(wù)。判定認(rèn)識(shí)或理論之是否真理，不是依主觀(guān)上覺(jué)得如何而定，而是依客觀(guān)上社會(huì)實(shí)踐的結(jié)果如何而定。真理的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)只能是社會(huì)的實(shí)踐。實(shí)踐的觀(guān)點(diǎn)是辯證唯物論的認(rèn)識(shí)論之第一的和基本的觀(guān)點(diǎn)⑵。
然而人的認(rèn)識(shí)究竟怎樣從實(shí)踐發(fā)生，而又服務(wù)于實(shí)踐呢？這只要看一看認(rèn)識(shí)的發(fā)展過(guò)程就會(huì)明了的。
原來(lái)人在實(shí)踐過(guò)程中，開(kāi)始只是看到過(guò)程中各個(gè)事物的現(xiàn)象方面，看到各個(gè)事物的片面，看到各個(gè)事物之間的外部聯(lián)系。例如有些外面的人們到延安來(lái)考察，頭一二天，他們看到了延安的地形、街道、屋宇，接觸了許多的人，參加了宴會(huì)、晚會(huì)和群眾大會(huì)，聽(tīng)到了各種說(shuō)話(huà)，看到了各種文件，這些就是事物的現(xiàn)象，事物的各個(gè)片面以及這些事物的外部聯(lián)系。這叫做認(rèn)識(shí)的感性階段，就是感覺(jué)和印象的階段。也就是延安這些各別的事物作用于考察團(tuán)先生們的感官，引起了他們的感覺(jué)，在他們的腦子中生起了許多的印象，以及這些印象間的大概的外部的聯(lián)系，這是認(rèn)識(shí)的第一個(gè)階段。在這個(gè)階段中，人們還不能造成深刻的概念，作出合乎論理（即合乎邏輯）的結(jié)論。
社會(huì)實(shí)踐的繼續(xù)，使人們?cè)趯?shí)踐中引起感覺(jué)和印象的東西反復(fù)了多次，于是在人們的腦子里生起了一個(gè)認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程中的突變（即飛躍），產(chǎn)生了概念。概念這種東西已經(jīng)不是事物的現(xiàn)象，不是事物的各個(gè)片面，不是它們的外部聯(lián)系，而是抓著了事物的本質(zhì)，事物的全體，事物的內(nèi)部聯(lián)系了。概念同感覺(jué)，不但是數(shù)量上的差別，而且有了性質(zhì)上的差別。循此繼進(jìn)，使用判斷和推理的方法，就可產(chǎn)生出合乎論理的結(jié)論來(lái)。《三國(guó)演義》上所謂“眉頭一皺計(jì)上心來(lái)”，我們普通說(shuō)話(huà)所謂“讓我想一想”，就是人在腦子中運(yùn)用概念以作判斷和推理的工夫。這是認(rèn)識(shí)的第二個(gè)階段。外來(lái)的考察團(tuán)先生們?cè)谒麄兗狭烁鞣N材料，加上他們“想了一想”之后，他們就能夠作出“共產(chǎn)黨的抗日民族統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線(xiàn)的政策是徹底的、誠(chéng)懇的和真實(shí)的”這樣一個(gè)判斷了。在他們作出這個(gè)判斷之后，如果他們對(duì)于團(tuán)結(jié)救國(guó)也是真實(shí)的的話(huà)，那末他們就能夠進(jìn)一步作出這樣的結(jié)論：“抗日民族統(tǒng)一戰(zhàn)線(xiàn)是能夠成功的。”這個(gè)概念、判斷和推理的階段，在人們對(duì)于一個(gè)事物的整個(gè)認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程中是更重要的階段，也就是理性認(rèn)識(shí)的階段。認(rèn)識(shí)的真正任務(wù)在于經(jīng)過(guò)感覺(jué)而到達(dá)于思維，到達(dá)于逐步了解客觀(guān)事物的內(nèi)部矛盾，了解它的規(guī)律性，了解這一過(guò)程和那一過(guò)程間的內(nèi)部聯(lián)系，即到達(dá)于論理的認(rèn)識(shí)。重復(fù)地說(shuō)，論理的認(rèn)識(shí)所以和感性的認(rèn)識(shí)不同，是因?yàn)楦行缘恼J(rèn)識(shí)是屬于事物之片面的、現(xiàn)象的、外部聯(lián)系的東西，論理的認(rèn)識(shí)則推進(jìn)了一大步，到達(dá)了事物的全體的、本質(zhì)的、內(nèi)部聯(lián)系的東西，到達(dá)了暴露周?chē)澜绲膬?nèi)在的矛盾，因而能在周?chē)澜绲目傮w上，在周?chē)澜缫磺蟹矫娴膬?nèi)部聯(lián)系上去把握周?chē)澜绲陌l(fā)展。
這種基于實(shí)踐的由淺入深的辯證唯物論的關(guān)于認(rèn)識(shí)發(fā)展過(guò)程的理論，在馬克思主義以前，是沒(méi)有一個(gè)人這樣解決過(guò)的。馬克思主義的唯物論，第一次正確地解決了這個(gè)問(wèn)題，唯物地而且辯證地指出了認(rèn)識(shí)的深化的運(yùn)動(dòng)，指出了社會(huì)的人在他們的生產(chǎn)和階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)的復(fù)雜的、經(jīng)常反復(fù)的實(shí)踐中，由感性認(rèn)識(shí)到論理認(rèn)識(shí)的推移的運(yùn)動(dòng)。列寧說(shuō)過(guò)：“物質(zhì)的抽象，自然規(guī)律的抽象，價(jià)值的抽象以及其他等等，一句話(huà)，一切科學(xué)的（正確的、鄭重的、非瞎說(shuō)的）抽象，都更深刻、更正確、更完全地反映著自然。”⑶馬克思列寧主義認(rèn)為：認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程中兩個(gè)階段的特性，在低級(jí)階段，認(rèn)識(shí)表現(xiàn)為感性的，在高級(jí)階段，認(rèn)識(shí)表現(xiàn)為論理的，但任何階段，都是統(tǒng)一的認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程中的階段。感性和理性二者的性質(zhì)不同，但又不是互相分離的，它們?cè)趯?shí)踐的基礎(chǔ)上統(tǒng)一起來(lái)了。我們的實(shí)踐證明：感覺(jué)到了的東西，我們不能立刻理解它，只有理解了的東西才更深刻地感覺(jué)它。感覺(jué)只解決現(xiàn)象問(wèn)題，理論才解決本質(zhì)問(wèn)題。這些問(wèn)題的解決，一點(diǎn)也不能離開(kāi)實(shí)踐。無(wú)論何人要認(rèn)識(shí)什么事物，除了同那個(gè)事物接觸，即生活于（實(shí)踐于）那個(gè)事物的環(huán)境中，是沒(méi)有法子解決的。不能在封建社會(huì)就預(yù)先認(rèn)識(shí)資本主義社會(huì)的規(guī)律，因?yàn)橘Y本主義還未出現(xiàn)，還無(wú)這種實(shí)踐。馬克思主義只能是資本主義社會(huì)的產(chǎn)物。馬克思不能在自由資本主義時(shí)代就預(yù)先具體地認(rèn)識(shí)帝國(guó)主義時(shí)代的某些特異的規(guī)律，因?yàn)榈蹏?guó)主義這個(gè)資本主義最后階段還未到來(lái)，還無(wú)這種實(shí)踐，只有列寧和斯大林才能擔(dān)當(dāng)此項(xiàng)任務(wù)。馬克思、恩格斯、列寧、斯大林之所以能夠作出他們的理論，除了他們的天才條件之外，主要地是他們親自參加了當(dāng)時(shí)的階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)和科學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)的實(shí)踐，沒(méi)有這后一個(gè)條件，任何天才也是不能成功的。“秀才不出門(mén)，全知天下事”，在技術(shù)不發(fā)達(dá)的古代只是一句空話(huà)，在技術(shù)發(fā)達(dá)的現(xiàn)代雖然可以實(shí)現(xiàn)這句話(huà)，然而真正親知的是天下實(shí)踐著的人，那些人在他們的實(shí)踐中間取得了“知”，經(jīng)過(guò)文字和技術(shù)的傳達(dá)而到達(dá)于“秀才”之手，秀才乃能間接地“知天下事”。如果要直接地認(rèn)識(shí)某種或某些事物，便只有親身參加于變革現(xiàn)實(shí)、變革某種或某些事物的實(shí)踐的斗爭(zhēng)中，才能觸到那種或那些事物的現(xiàn)象，也只有在親身參加變革現(xiàn)實(shí)的實(shí)踐的斗爭(zhēng)中，才能暴露那種或那些事物的本質(zhì)而理解它們。這是任何人實(shí)際上走著的認(rèn)識(shí)路程，不過(guò)有些人故意歪曲地說(shuō)些反對(duì)的話(huà)罷了。世上最可笑的是那些“知識(shí)里手”⑷，有了道聽(tīng)途說(shuō)的一知半解，便自封為“天下第一”，適足見(jiàn)其不自量而已。知識(shí)的問(wèn)題是一個(gè)科學(xué)問(wèn)題，來(lái)不得半點(diǎn)的虛偽和驕傲，決定地需要的倒是其反面——誠(chéng)實(shí)和謙遜的態(tài)度。你要有知識(shí)，你就得參加變革現(xiàn)實(shí)的實(shí)踐。你要知道梨子的滋味，你就得變革梨子，親口吃一吃。你要知道原子的組織同性質(zhì)，你就得實(shí)行物理學(xué)和化學(xué)的實(shí)驗(yàn)，變革原子的情況。你要知道革命的理論和方法，你就得參加革命。一切真知都是從直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)發(fā)源的。但人不能事事直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)，事實(shí)上多數(shù)的知識(shí)都是間接經(jīng)驗(yàn)的東西，這就是一切古代的和外域的知識(shí)。這些知識(shí)在古人在外人是直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)的東西，如果在古人外人直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)時(shí)是符合于列寧所說(shuō)的條件“科學(xué)的抽象”，是科學(xué)地反映了客觀(guān)的事物，那末這些知識(shí)是可靠的，否則就是不可靠的。所以，一個(gè)人的知識(shí)，不外直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)的和間接經(jīng)驗(yàn)的兩部分。而且在我為間接經(jīng)驗(yàn)者，在人則仍為直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)。因此，就知識(shí)的總體說(shuō)來(lái)，無(wú)論何種知識(shí)都是不能離開(kāi)直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)的。任何知識(shí)的來(lái)源，在于人的肉體感官對(duì)客觀(guān)外界的感覺(jué)，否認(rèn)了這個(gè)感覺(jué)，否認(rèn)了直接經(jīng)驗(yàn)，否認(rèn)親自參加變革現(xiàn)實(shí)的實(shí)踐，他就不是唯物論者。“知識(shí)里手”之所以可笑，原因就是在這個(gè)地方。中國(guó)人有一句老話(huà)：“不入虎穴，焉得虎子。”這句話(huà)對(duì)于人們的實(shí)踐是真理，對(duì)于認(rèn)識(shí)論也是真理。離開(kāi)實(shí)踐的認(rèn)識(shí)是不可能的。
為了明了基于變革現(xiàn)實(shí)的實(shí)踐而產(chǎn)生的辯證唯物論的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)——認(rèn)識(shí)的逐漸深化的運(yùn)動(dòng)，下面再舉出幾個(gè)具體的例子。
無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)對(duì)于資本主義社會(huì)的認(rèn)識(shí)，在其實(shí)踐的初期——破壞機(jī)器和自發(fā)斗爭(zhēng)時(shí)期，他們還只在感性認(rèn)識(shí)的階段，只認(rèn)識(shí)資本主義各個(gè)現(xiàn)象的片面及其外部的聯(lián)系。這時(shí)，他們還是一個(gè)所謂“自在的階級(jí)”。但是到了他們實(shí)踐的第二個(gè)時(shí)期——有意識(shí)有組織的經(jīng)濟(jì)斗爭(zhēng)和政治斗爭(zhēng)的時(shí)期，由于實(shí)踐，由于長(zhǎng)期斗爭(zhēng)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，經(jīng)過(guò)馬克思、恩格斯用科學(xué)的方法把這種種經(jīng)驗(yàn)總結(jié)起來(lái)，產(chǎn)生了馬克思主義的理論，用以教育無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)，這樣就使無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)理解了資本主義社會(huì)的本質(zhì)，理解了社會(huì)階級(jí)的剝削關(guān)系，理解了無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)的歷史任務(wù)，這時(shí)他們就變成了一個(gè)“自為的階級(jí)”。
中國(guó)人民對(duì)于帝國(guó)主義的認(rèn)識(shí)也是這樣。第一階段是表面的感性的認(rèn)識(shí)階段，表現(xiàn)在太平天國(guó)運(yùn)動(dòng)和義和團(tuán)運(yùn)動(dòng)等籠統(tǒng)的排外主義的斗爭(zhēng)上⑸。第二階段才進(jìn)到理性的認(rèn)識(shí)階段，看出了帝國(guó)主義內(nèi)部和外部的各種矛盾，并看出了帝國(guó)主義聯(lián)合中國(guó)買(mǎi)辦階級(jí)和封建階級(jí)以壓榨中國(guó)人民大眾的實(shí)質(zhì)，這種認(rèn)識(shí)是從一九一九年五四運(yùn)動(dòng)⑹前后才開(kāi)始的。
我們?cè)賮?lái)看戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，如果他們是一些沒(méi)有戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的人，對(duì)于一個(gè)具體的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)（例如我們過(guò)去十年的土地革命戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)）的深刻的指導(dǎo)規(guī)律，在開(kāi)始階段是不了解的。他們?cè)陂_(kāi)始階段只是身歷了許多作戰(zhàn)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，而且敗仗是打得很多的。然而由于這些經(jīng)驗(yàn)（勝仗，特別是敗仗的經(jīng)驗(yàn)），使他們能夠理解貫串整個(gè)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的內(nèi)部的東西，即那個(gè)具體戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的規(guī)律性，懂得了戰(zhàn)略和戰(zhàn)術(shù)，因而能夠有把握地去指導(dǎo)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)。此時(shí)，如果改換一個(gè)無(wú)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的人去指導(dǎo)，又會(huì)要在吃了一些敗仗之后（有了經(jīng)驗(yàn)之后）才能理會(huì)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的正確的規(guī)律。
常常聽(tīng)到一些同志在不能勇敢接受工作任務(wù)時(shí)說(shuō)出來(lái)的一句話(huà)：沒(méi)有把握。為什么沒(méi)有把握呢？因?yàn)樗麑?duì)于這項(xiàng)工作的內(nèi)容和環(huán)境沒(méi)有規(guī)律性的了解，或者他從來(lái)就沒(méi)有接觸過(guò)這類(lèi)工作，或者接觸得不多，因而無(wú)從談到這類(lèi)工作的規(guī)律性。及至把工作的情況和環(huán)境給以詳細(xì)分析之后，他就覺(jué)得比較地有了把握，愿意去做這項(xiàng)工作。如果這個(gè)人在這項(xiàng)工作中經(jīng)過(guò)了一個(gè)時(shí)期，他有了這項(xiàng)工作的經(jīng)驗(yàn)了，而他又是一個(gè)肯虛心體察情況的人，不是一個(gè)主觀(guān)地、片面地、表面地看問(wèn)題的人，他就能夠自己做出應(yīng)該怎樣進(jìn)行工作的結(jié)論，他的工作勇氣也就可以大大地提高了。只有那些主觀(guān)地、片面地和表面地看問(wèn)題的人，跑到一個(gè)地方，不問(wèn)環(huán)境的情況，不看事情的全體（事情的歷史和全部現(xiàn)狀），也不觸到事情的本質(zhì)（事情的性質(zhì)及此一事情和其他事情的內(nèi)部聯(lián)系），就自以為是地發(fā)號(hào)施令起來(lái)，這樣的人是沒(méi)有不跌交子的。
由此看來(lái)，認(rèn)識(shí)的過(guò)程，第一步，是開(kāi)始接觸外界事情，屬于感覺(jué)的階段。第二步，是綜合感覺(jué)的材料加以整理和改造，屬于概念、判斷和推理的階段。只有感覺(jué)的材料十分豐富（不是零碎不全）和合于實(shí)際（不是錯(cuò)覺(jué)），才能根據(jù)這樣的材料造出正確的概念和論理來(lái)。
這里有兩個(gè)要點(diǎn)必須著重指明。第一個(gè)，在前面已經(jīng)說(shuō)過(guò)的，這里再重復(fù)說(shuō)一說(shuō)，就是理性認(rèn)識(shí)依賴(lài)于感性認(rèn)識(shí)的問(wèn)題。如果以為理性認(rèn)識(shí)可以不從感性認(rèn)識(shí)得來(lái)，他就是一個(gè)唯心論者。哲學(xué)史上有所謂“唯理論”一派，就是只承認(rèn)理性的實(shí)在性，不承認(rèn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)的實(shí)在性，以為只有理性靠得住，而感覺(jué)的經(jīng)驗(yàn)是靠不住的，這一派的錯(cuò)誤在于顛倒了事實(shí)。理性的東西所以靠得住，正是由于它來(lái)源于感性，否則理性的東西就成了無(wú)源之水，無(wú)本之木，而只是主觀(guān)自生的靠不住的東西了。從認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程的秩序說(shuō)來(lái)，感覺(jué)經(jīng)驗(yàn)是第一的東西，我們強(qiáng)調(diào)社會(huì)實(shí)踐在認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程中的意義，就在于只有社會(huì)實(shí)踐才能使人的認(rèn)識(shí)開(kāi)始發(fā)生，開(kāi)始從客觀(guān)外界得到感覺(jué)經(jīng)驗(yàn)。一個(gè)閉目塞聽(tīng)、同客觀(guān)外界根本絕緣的人，是無(wú)所謂認(rèn)識(shí)的。認(rèn)識(shí)開(kāi)始于經(jīng)驗(yàn)——這就是認(rèn)識(shí)論的唯物論。
第二是認(rèn)識(shí)有待于深化，認(rèn)識(shí)的感性階段有待于發(fā)展到理性階段——這就是認(rèn)識(shí)論的辯證法⑺。如果以為認(rèn)識(shí)可以停頓在低級(jí)的感性階段，以為只有感性認(rèn)識(shí)可靠，而理性認(rèn)識(shí)是靠不住的，這便是重復(fù)了歷史上的“經(jīng)驗(yàn)論”的錯(cuò)誤。這種理論的錯(cuò)誤，在于不知道感覺(jué)材料固然是客觀(guān)外界某些真實(shí)性的反映（我這里不來(lái)說(shuō)經(jīng)驗(yàn)只是所謂內(nèi)省體驗(yàn)的那種唯心的經(jīng)驗(yàn)論），但它們僅是片面的和表面的東西，這種反映是不完全的，是沒(méi)有反映事物本質(zhì)的。要完全地反映整個(gè)的事物，反映事物的本質(zhì)，反映事物的內(nèi)部規(guī)律性，就必須經(jīng)過(guò)思考作用，將豐富的感覺(jué)材料加以去粗取精、去偽存真、由此及彼、由表及里的改造制作工夫，造成概念和理論的系統(tǒng)，就必須從感性認(rèn)識(shí)躍進(jìn)到理性認(rèn)識(shí)。這種改造過(guò)的認(rèn)識(shí)，不是更空虛了更不可靠了的認(rèn)識(shí)，相反，只要是在認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程中根據(jù)于實(shí)踐基礎(chǔ)而科學(xué)地改造過(guò)的東西，正如列寧所說(shuō)乃是更深刻、更正確、更完全地反映客觀(guān)事物的東西。庸俗的事務(wù)主義家不是這樣，他們尊重經(jīng)驗(yàn)而看輕理論，因而不能通觀(guān)客觀(guān)過(guò)程的全體，缺乏明確的方針，沒(méi)有遠(yuǎn)大的前途，沾沾自喜于一得之功和一孔之見(jiàn)。這種人如果指導(dǎo)革命，就會(huì)引導(dǎo)革命走上碰壁的地步。
理性認(rèn)識(shí)依賴(lài)于感性認(rèn)識(shí)，感性認(rèn)識(shí)有待于發(fā)展到理性認(rèn)識(shí)，這就是辯證唯物論的認(rèn)識(shí)論。哲學(xué)上的“唯理論”和“經(jīng)驗(yàn)論”都不懂得認(rèn)識(shí)的歷史性或辯證性，雖然各有片面的真理（對(duì)于唯物的唯理論和經(jīng)驗(yàn)論而言，非指唯心的唯理論和經(jīng)驗(yàn)論），但在認(rèn)識(shí)論的全體上則都是錯(cuò)誤的。由感性到理性之辯證唯物論的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)，對(duì)于一個(gè)小的認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程（例如對(duì)于一個(gè)事物或一件工作的認(rèn)識(shí)）是如此，對(duì)于一個(gè)大的認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程（例如對(duì)于一個(gè)社會(huì)或一個(gè)革命的認(rèn)識(shí)）也是如此。
然而認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)至此還沒(méi)有完結(jié)。辯證唯物論的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)，如果只到理性認(rèn)識(shí)為止，那末還只說(shuō)到問(wèn)題的一半。而且對(duì)于馬克思主義的哲學(xué)說(shuō)來(lái)，還只說(shuō)到非十分重要的那一半。馬克思主義的哲學(xué)認(rèn)為十分重要的問(wèn)題，不在于懂得了客觀(guān)世界的規(guī)律性，因而能夠解釋世界，而在于拿了這種對(duì)于客觀(guān)規(guī)律性的認(rèn)識(shí)去能動(dòng)地改造世界。在馬克思主義看來(lái)，理論是重要的，它的重要性充分地表現(xiàn)在列寧說(shuō)過(guò)的一句話(huà)：“沒(méi)有革命的理論，就不會(huì)有革命的運(yùn)動(dòng)。”⑻然而馬克思主義看重理論，正是，也僅僅是，因?yàn)樗軌蛑笇?dǎo)行動(dòng)。如果有了正確的理論，只是把它空談一陣，束之高閣，并不實(shí)行，那末，這種理論再好也是沒(méi)有意義的。認(rèn)識(shí)從實(shí)踐始，經(jīng)過(guò)實(shí)踐得到了理論的認(rèn)識(shí)，還須再回到實(shí)踐去。認(rèn)識(shí)的能動(dòng)作用，不但表現(xiàn)于從感性的認(rèn)識(shí)到理性的認(rèn)識(shí)之能動(dòng)的飛躍，更重要的還須表現(xiàn)于從理性的認(rèn)識(shí)到革命的實(shí)踐這一個(gè)飛躍。抓著了世界的規(guī)律性的認(rèn)識(shí)，必須把它再回到改造世界的實(shí)踐中去，再用到生產(chǎn)的實(shí)踐、革命的階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)和民族斗爭(zhēng)的實(shí)踐以及科學(xué)實(shí)驗(yàn)的實(shí)踐中去。這就是檢驗(yàn)理論和發(fā)展理論的過(guò)程，是整個(gè)認(rèn)識(shí)過(guò)程的繼續(xù)。理論的東西之是否符合于客觀(guān)真理性這個(gè)問(wèn)題，在前面說(shuō)的由感性到理性之認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)中是沒(méi)有完全解決的，也不能完全解決的。要完全地解決這個(gè)問(wèn)題，只有把理性的認(rèn)識(shí)再回到社會(huì)實(shí)踐中去，應(yīng)用理論于實(shí)踐，看它是否能夠達(dá)到預(yù)想的目的。許多自然科學(xué)理論之所以被稱(chēng)為真理，不但在于自然科學(xué)家們創(chuàng)立這些學(xué)說(shuō)的時(shí)候，而且在于為爾后的科學(xué)實(shí)踐所證實(shí)的時(shí)候。馬克思列寧主義之所以被稱(chēng)為真理，也不但在于馬克思、恩格斯、列寧、斯大林等人科學(xué)地構(gòu)成這些學(xué)說(shuō)的時(shí)候，而且在于為爾后革命的階級(jí)斗爭(zhēng)和民族斗爭(zhēng)的實(shí)踐所證實(shí)的時(shí)候。辯證唯物論之所以為普遍真理，在于經(jīng)過(guò)無(wú)論什么人的實(shí)踐都不能逃出它的范圍。人類(lèi)認(rèn)識(shí)的歷史告訴我們，許多理論的真理性是不完全的，經(jīng)過(guò)實(shí)踐的檢驗(yàn)而糾正了它們的不完全性。許多理論是錯(cuò)誤的，經(jīng)過(guò)實(shí)踐的檢驗(yàn)而糾正其錯(cuò)誤。所謂實(shí)踐是真理的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，所謂“生活、實(shí)踐底觀(guān)點(diǎn)，應(yīng)該是認(rèn)識(shí)論底首先的和基本的觀(guān)點(diǎn)”⑼，理由就在這個(gè)地方。斯大林說(shuō)得好：“理論若不和革命實(shí)踐聯(lián)系起來(lái)，就會(huì)變成無(wú)對(duì)象的理論，同樣，實(shí)踐若不以革命理論為指南，就會(huì)變成盲目的實(shí)踐。”⑽
說(shuō)到這里，認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)就算完成了嗎？我們的答復(fù)是完成了，又沒(méi)有完成。社會(huì)的人們投身于變革在某一發(fā)展階段內(nèi)的某一客觀(guān)過(guò)程的實(shí)踐中（不論是關(guān)于變革某一自然過(guò)程的實(shí)踐，或變革某一社會(huì)過(guò)程的實(shí)踐），由于客觀(guān)過(guò)程的反映和主觀(guān)能動(dòng)性的作用，使得人們的認(rèn)識(shí)由感性的推移到了理性的，造成了大體上相應(yīng)于該客觀(guān)過(guò)程的法則性的思想、理論、計(jì)劃或方案，然后再應(yīng)用這種思想、理論、計(jì)劃或方案于該同一客觀(guān)過(guò)程的實(shí)踐，如果能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)預(yù)想的目的，即將預(yù)定的思想、理論、計(jì)劃、方案在該同一過(guò)程的實(shí)踐中變?yōu)槭聦?shí)，或者大體上變?yōu)槭聦?shí)，那末，對(duì)于這一具體過(guò)程的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)算是完成了。例如，在變革自然的過(guò)程中，某一工程計(jì)劃的實(shí)現(xiàn)，某一科學(xué)假想的證實(shí)，某一器物的制成，某一農(nóng)產(chǎn)的收獲，在變革社會(huì)過(guò)程中某一罷工的勝利，某一戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)的勝利，某一教育計(jì)劃的實(shí)現(xiàn)，都算實(shí)現(xiàn)了預(yù)想的目的。然而一般地說(shuō)來(lái)，不論在變革自然或變革社會(huì)的實(shí)踐中，人們?cè)ǖ乃枷搿⒗碚摗⒂?jì)劃、方案，毫無(wú)改變地實(shí)現(xiàn)出來(lái)的事，是很少的。這是因?yàn)閺氖伦兏铿F(xiàn)實(shí)的人們，常常受著許多的限制，不但常常受著科學(xué)條件和技術(shù)條件的限制，而且也受著客觀(guān)過(guò)程的發(fā)展及其表現(xiàn)程度的限制（客觀(guān)過(guò)程的方面及本質(zhì)尚未充分暴露）。在這種情形之下，由于實(shí)踐中發(fā)現(xiàn)前所未料的情況，因而部分地改變思想、理論、計(jì)劃、方案的事是常有的，全部地改變的事也是有的。即是說(shuō)，原定的思想、理論、計(jì)劃、方案，部分地或全部地不合于實(shí)際，部分錯(cuò)了或全部錯(cuò)了的事，都是有的。許多時(shí)候須反復(fù)失敗過(guò)多次，才能糾正錯(cuò)誤的認(rèn)識(shí)，才能到達(dá)于和客觀(guān)過(guò)程的規(guī)律性相符合，因而才能夠變主觀(guān)的東西為客觀(guān)的東西，即在實(shí)踐中得到預(yù)想的結(jié)果。但是不管怎樣，到了這種時(shí)候，人們對(duì)于在某一發(fā)展階段內(nèi)的某一客觀(guān)過(guò)程的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)，算是完成了。
然而對(duì)于過(guò)程的推移而言，人們的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)是沒(méi)有完成的。任何過(guò)程，不論是屬于自然界的和屬于社會(huì)的，由于內(nèi)部的矛盾和斗爭(zhēng)，都是向前推移向前發(fā)展的，人們的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)也應(yīng)跟著推移和發(fā)展。依社會(huì)運(yùn)動(dòng)來(lái)說(shuō)，真正的革命的指導(dǎo)者，不但在于當(dāng)自己的思想、理論、計(jì)劃、方案有錯(cuò)誤時(shí)須得善于改正，如同上面已經(jīng)說(shuō)到的，而且在于當(dāng)某一客觀(guān)過(guò)程已經(jīng)從某一發(fā)展階段向另一發(fā)展階段推移轉(zhuǎn)變的時(shí)候，須得善于使自己和參加革命的一切人員在主觀(guān)認(rèn)識(shí)上也跟著推移轉(zhuǎn)變，即是要使新的革命任務(wù)和新的工作方案的提出，適合于新的情況的變化。革命時(shí)期情況的變化是很急速的，如果革命黨人的認(rèn)識(shí)不能隨之而急速變化，就不能引導(dǎo)革命走向勝利。
然而思想落后于實(shí)際的事是常有的，這是因?yàn)槿说恼J(rèn)識(shí)受了許多社會(huì)條件的限制的緣故。我們反對(duì)革命隊(duì)伍中的頑固派，他們的思想不能隨變化了的客觀(guān)情況而前進(jìn)，在歷史上表現(xiàn)為右傾機(jī)會(huì)主義。這些人看不出矛盾的斗爭(zhēng)已將客觀(guān)過(guò)程推向前進(jìn)了，而他們的認(rèn)識(shí)仍然停止在舊階段。一切頑固黨的思想都有這樣的特征。他們的思想離開(kāi)了社會(huì)的實(shí)踐，他們不能站在社會(huì)車(chē)輪的前頭充任向?qū)У墓ぷ鳎麄冎恢谲?chē)子后面怨恨車(chē)子走得太快了，企圖把它向后拉，開(kāi)倒車(chē)。
我們也反對(duì)“左”翼空談主義。他們的思想超過(guò)客觀(guān)過(guò)程的一定發(fā)展階段，有些把幻想看作真理，有些則把僅在將來(lái)有現(xiàn)實(shí)可能性的理想，勉強(qiáng)地放在現(xiàn)時(shí)來(lái)做，離開(kāi)了當(dāng)前大多數(shù)人的實(shí)踐，離開(kāi)了當(dāng)前的現(xiàn)實(shí)性，在行動(dòng)上表現(xiàn)為冒險(xiǎn)主義。
唯心論和機(jī)械唯物論，機(jī)會(huì)主義和冒險(xiǎn)主義，都是以主觀(guān)和客觀(guān)相分裂，以認(rèn)識(shí)和實(shí)踐相脫離為特征的。以科學(xué)的社會(huì)實(shí)踐為特征的馬克思列寧主義的認(rèn)識(shí)論，不能不堅(jiān)決反對(duì)這些錯(cuò)誤思想。馬克思主義者承認(rèn)，在絕對(duì)的總的宇宙發(fā)展過(guò)程中，各個(gè)具體過(guò)程的發(fā)展都是相對(duì)的，因而在絕對(duì)真理的長(zhǎng)河中，人們對(duì)于在各個(gè)一定發(fā)展階段上的具體過(guò)程的認(rèn)識(shí)只具有相對(duì)的真理性。無(wú)數(shù)相對(duì)的真理之總和，就是絕對(duì)的真理⑾。客觀(guān)過(guò)程的發(fā)展是充滿(mǎn)著矛盾和斗爭(zhēng)的發(fā)展，人的認(rèn)識(shí)運(yùn)動(dòng)的發(fā)展也是充滿(mǎn)著矛盾和斗爭(zhēng)的發(fā)展。一切客觀(guān)世界的辯證法的運(yùn)動(dòng)，都或先或后地能夠反映到人的認(rèn)識(shí)中來(lái)。社會(huì)實(shí)踐中的發(fā)生、發(fā)展和消滅的過(guò)程是無(wú)窮的，人的認(rèn)識(shí)的發(fā)生、發(fā)展和消滅的過(guò)程也是無(wú)窮的。根據(jù)于一定的思想、理論、計(jì)劃、方案以從事于變革客觀(guān)現(xiàn)實(shí)的實(shí)踐，一次又一次地向前，人們對(duì)于客觀(guān)現(xiàn)實(shí)的認(rèn)識(shí)也就一次又一次地深化。客觀(guān)現(xiàn)實(shí)世界的變化運(yùn)動(dòng)永遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有完結(jié)，人們?cè)趯?shí)踐中對(duì)于真理的認(rèn)識(shí)也就永遠(yuǎn)沒(méi)有完結(jié)。馬克思列寧主義并沒(méi)有結(jié)束真理，而是在實(shí)踐中不斷地開(kāi)辟認(rèn)識(shí)真理的道路。我們的結(jié)論是主觀(guān)和客觀(guān)、理論和實(shí)踐、知和行的具體的歷史的統(tǒng)一，反對(duì)一切離開(kāi)具體歷史的“左”的或右的錯(cuò)誤思想。
社會(huì)的發(fā)展到了今天的時(shí)代，正確地認(rèn)識(shí)世界和改造世界的責(zé)任，已經(jīng)歷史地落在無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)及其政黨的肩上。這種根據(jù)科學(xué)認(rèn)識(shí)而定下來(lái)的改造世界的實(shí)踐過(guò)程，在世界、在中國(guó)均已到達(dá)了一個(gè)歷史的時(shí)節(jié)——自有歷史以來(lái)未曾有過(guò)的重大時(shí)節(jié)，這就是整個(gè)兒地推翻世界和中國(guó)的黑暗面，把它們轉(zhuǎn)變過(guò)來(lái)成為前所未有的光明世界。無(wú)產(chǎn)階級(jí)和革命人民改造世界的斗爭(zhēng)，包括實(shí)現(xiàn)下述的任務(wù)：改造客觀(guān)世界，也改造自己的主觀(guān)世界——改造自己的認(rèn)識(shí)能力，改造主觀(guān)世界同客觀(guān)世界的關(guān)系。地球上已經(jīng)有一部分實(shí)行了這種改造，這就是蘇聯(lián)。他們還正在促進(jìn)這種改造過(guò)程。中國(guó)人民和世界人民也都正在或?qū)⒁ㄟ^(guò)這樣的改造過(guò)程。所謂被改造的客觀(guān)世界，其中包括了一切反對(duì)改造的人們，他們的被改造，須要通過(guò)強(qiáng)迫的階段，然后才能進(jìn)入自覺(jué)的階段。世界到了全人類(lèi)都自覺(jué)地改造自己和改造世界的時(shí)候，那就是世界的共產(chǎn)主義時(shí)代。
通過(guò)實(shí)踐而發(fā)現(xiàn)真理，又通過(guò)實(shí)踐而證實(shí)真理和發(fā)展真理。從感性認(rèn)識(shí)而能動(dòng)地發(fā)展到理性認(rèn)識(shí)，又從理性認(rèn)識(shí)而能動(dòng)地指導(dǎo)革命實(shí)踐，改造主觀(guān)世界和客觀(guān)世界。實(shí)踐、認(rèn)識(shí)、再實(shí)踐、再認(rèn)識(shí)，這種形式，循環(huán)往復(fù)以至無(wú)窮，而實(shí)踐和認(rèn)識(shí)之每一循環(huán)的內(nèi)容，都比較地進(jìn)到了高一級(jí)的程度。這就是辯證唯物論的全部認(rèn)識(shí)論，這就是辯證唯物論的知行統(tǒng)一觀(guān)。
注：在中國(guó)共產(chǎn)黨內(nèi)，曾經(jīng)有一部分教條主義的同志長(zhǎng)期拒絕中國(guó)革命的經(jīng)驗(yàn)，否認(rèn)“馬克思主義不是教條而是行動(dòng)的指南”這個(gè)真理，而只生吞活剝馬克思主義書(shū)籍中的只言片語(yǔ)，去嚇唬人們。還有另一部分經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義的同志長(zhǎng)期拘守于自身的片斷經(jīng)驗(yàn)，不了解理論對(duì)于革命實(shí)踐的重要性，看不見(jiàn)革命的全局，雖然也是辛苦地——但卻是盲目地在工作。這兩類(lèi)同志的錯(cuò)誤思想，特別是教條主義思想，曾經(jīng)在一九三一年至一九三四年使得中國(guó)革命受了極大的損失，而教條主義者卻是披著馬克思主義的外衣迷惑了廣大的同志。
毛澤東的《實(shí)踐論》，是為著用馬克思主義的認(rèn)識(shí)論觀(guān)點(diǎn)去揭露黨內(nèi)的教條主義和經(jīng)驗(yàn)主義——特別是教條主義這些主觀(guān)主義的錯(cuò)誤而寫(xiě)的。因?yàn)橹攸c(diǎn)是揭露看輕實(shí)踐的教條主義這種主觀(guān)主義，故題為《實(shí)踐論》。毛澤東曾以這篇論文的觀(guān)點(diǎn)在延安的抗日軍事政治大學(xué)作過(guò)講演。
ON PRACTICE
On the Relation Between Knowledge and Practice, Between Knowing and Doing
Mao Tse-tung
July 1937
Before Marx, materialism examined the problem of knowledge apart from the social nature of man and apart from his historical development, and was therefore incapable of understanding the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production and the class struggle.
Above all, Marxists regard man’s activity in production as the most fundamental practical activity, the determinant of all his other activities. Man’s knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he comes gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties and the law of nature, and the relations between himself and nature; and through his activity in production he also gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man. None of this knowledge can he acquired apart from activity in production. In a classless society every person, as a member of society, joins in common effort with the other members, enters into definite relations of production with them and engages in production to meet man’s material needs. In all class societies, the members of the different social classes also enter, in different ways, into definite relations of production and engage in production to meet their material needs. This is the primary source from which human knowledge develops.
Man’s social practice is not confined to activity in production, but take many other forms—class struggle, political life, scientific and artistic pursuits; in short, as a social being, man participates in all spheres of the practical life of society. Thus man, in varying degrees, comes to know the different relations between man and man, not only through his material life but also through his political and cultural life(both of which are intimately bound up with material life). Of these other types of social practice, class struggle in particular, in all its various forms, exerts a profound influence on the development of man’s knowledge. In class society everyone lives as a member of a particular class, and every kind of thinking, without exception, is stamped with the brand of a class.
Marxists hold that in human society activity an production develops step by step from a lower to a higher level and that consequently man’s knowledge, whether of nature or of society, also develops step by step from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided. For a very long period in history, men were necessarily confined to a one-sided understanding of the history of society because, for one thing, the bias of the exploiting classes always distorted history and, for another, the small scale of production limited man’s outlook. It was not until the modern proletariat emerged along with immense forces of production (large-scale industry) that man was able to acquire a comprehensive, historical understanding of the development of society and turn this knowledge into a science, the science of Marxism.
Marxists hold that man’s social practice alone is the criterion of the truth of his knowledge of the external world. What actually happens is that man’s knowledge is verified only when he achieves the anticipated results in the process of social practice (material production, class struggle or scientific experiment). If a man wants to succeed in his work, that is, to achieve the anticipated results, he must bring his ideas into correspondence with the laws of the objective external world; if they do not correspond, he will fail in his practice. After he fails, he draws his lessons, corrects his ideas to make them correspond to the laws of the external world, and can thus turn failure into success; this is what is meant by “failure is the mother of success” and “a fall into the pit, a gain in your wit”. The dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be which deny the importance of practice or separate knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, “Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality.” The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism has two outstanding characteristics. One is its class nature: it openly avows that dialectical materialism is in the service of the proletariat. The other is its practicality: it emphasizes the dependence of theory on practice, emphasized that theory is based on practice and in turn serves practice. The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not be subjective feelings, but by objective results in social practice. Only social practice is the primary and basic standpoint in the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge.
But how then does human knowledge arise from practice and in turn serve practice? This will become clear if we look at the process of development of knowledge.
In the process of practice, man at first sees only the phenomenal side, the separate aspects, the external relations of things. For instance, some people from outside come to Yenan on a tour of observation. In the first day or two, they see its topography, streets and houses; they meet many people, attend banquets, evening parties and mass meetings, hear talk of various kinds and read various documents, all these being the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things. This is called the perceptual stage of cognition, namely, the stage of sense perceptions and impressions. That is, these particular things in Yenan act on the sense organs of the members of the observation group, evoke sense perceptions and give rise in their brains to many impressions together with a rough sketch of the external relations among these impressions: this is the first stage of cognition. At this stage, man cannot as yet form concepts, which are deeper, or draw logical conclusions.
As social practice continues, things that give rise to man’s sense perceptions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations of things. Between concepts and sense perceptions there is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative difference. Proceeding further, by means of judgement and inference one is able to draw logical conclusions. The expression in San Kuo Yen Yi, “knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind”, or in everyday language, “let me think it over”, refers to man’s use of concepts in the brain to form judgements and inferences. This is the second stage of cognition. When the members of the observation group have collected various data and, what is more, have “thought them over”, they are able to arrive at the judgement that “the Communist Party’s policy of the National United Front Against Japan is thorough, sincere and genuine”. Having made this judgement, they can, if they too are genuine about uniting to save the nation, go a step further and draw the following conclusion, “The National United Front Against Japan can succeed.” This stage of conception, judgement and inference is the more important stage in the entire process of knowing a thing; it is the stage of rational knowledge. The real task of knowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and another, that is, to arrive at logical knowledge. To repeat, logical knowledge differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate aspects, the phenomena and the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge takes a big stride forward to teach the totality, the essence and the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical knowledge is capable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality, in the internal relations of all its aspects.
This dialectical-materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, basing itself on practice and proceeding from the shallower to the deeper, was never worked out by anybody before the rise of Marxism. Marxist materialism solved this problem correctly for the first time, pointing out both materialistically and dialectically the deepening movement of cognition, the movement by which man in society progresses from perceptual knowledge to logical knowledge in his complex, constantly recurring practice of production and class struggle. Lenin said, “The abstraction of matter, of a law of nature, the abstraction of value, etc., in short, all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature more deeply, truly and completely.” Marxism-Leninism holds that each of the two stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage, but that both are stages in an integrated process of cognition. The perceptual and the rational are qualitatively different, but are not divorced from each other; they are unified on the basis of practice. Our practice proves that what is perceived cannot at once be comprehended and that only what is comprehended can be more deeply perceived. Perception only solves the problem of phenomena; theory alone can solve the problem of essence. The solving of both these problems is not separable in the slightest degree from practice. Whoever wants to know a thing has no way of doing so except by coming into contact with it, that is, by living (practicing) in its environment. In feudal society it was impossible to know the laws of capitalist society in advance because capitalism had not yet emerged, the relevant practice was lacking. Marxism could be the product only of capitalist society. Marx, in the era of laissez-faire capitalism, could not concretely know certain laws peculiar to the era of imperialism beforehand, because imperialism, the last stage of capitalism, had not yet emerged and the relevant practice was lacking; only Lenin and Stalin could undertake this task. Leaving aside their genius, the reason why Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin could work out their theories was mainly that they personally took part in the practice of the class struggle and the scientific experimentation of their time; lacking this condition, no genius could have succeeded. The saying, “without stepping outside his gate the scholar knows all the wide world’s affairs”, was mere empty talk in past times when technology was undeveloped. Even though this saying can be valid in the present age of developed technology, the people with real personal knowledge are those engaged in practice the wide world over. And it is only when these people have come to “know” through their practice and when their knowledge has reached him through writing and technical media that the “scholar” can indirectly “know all the wide world’s affairs.” If you want to know a certain thing or a certain class of things directly, you must personally participate in the practical struggle to change reality, to change that thing or class of things, for only thus can you come into contact with them as phenomena; only through personal participation in the practical struggle to change reality can you uncover the essence of that thing or class of things and comprehend them. This is the path to knowledge which every man actually travels, though some people, deliberately distorting matters, argue to the contrary. The most ridiculous person in the world is the “know-all” who picks up a smattering of hearsay knowledge and proclaims himself “the world’s Number One authority”; this merely shows that he has not taken a proper measure of himself. Knowledge is a matter of science, and no dishonesty or conceit whatsoever is permissible. What is required is definitely the reverse—honesty and modesty. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want knowledge, you must take part in the practice of changing reality. If you want to know the taste of a pear, you must change the pear by eating it yourself. If you want to know the structure and properties of the atom, you must make physical and chemical experiments to change the state of the atom. If you want to know the theory and methods of revolution, you must take part in revolution. All genuine knowledge originates in direct experience. But one cannot have direct experience of everything; as a matter of fact, most of our knowledge comes from indirect experience, for example, all knowledge from past times and foreign lands. To our ancestors and to foreigners, such knowledge was—or is—a matter of direct experience, and this knowledge is reliable if in the course of their direct experience the requirement of “scientific abstraction”, spoken of by Lenin, was—or is—fulfilled and objective reality scientifically reflected, otherwise it is not reliable. Hence a man’s knowledge consists only of two parts, that which comes from direct experience and that which comes from indirect experience. Moreover, what is indirect experience for me is direct experience for other people. Consequently, considered as a whole, knowledge of any kind is inseparable from direct experience. All knowledge originates in perception of the objective external world through man’s physical sense organs. Anyone who denies such perception, denies direct experience, or denies personal participation in the practice that changes reality, is not a materialist. That is why the “know-all” is ridiculous. There is an old Chinese saying, “How can you catch tiger cubs without entering the tiger’s lair?” This saying holds true for man’s practice and it also holds true for the theory of knowledge. There can be no knowledge apart from practice.
To make clear the dialectical-materialist movement of cognition arising on the basis of the practice which changes reality—to make clear the gradually deepening movement of cognition—a few additional concrete examples are given below.
In its knowledge of capitalist society, the proletariat was only in the perceptual stage of cognition in the first period of its practice, the period of machine-smashing and spontaneous struggle; it knew only some of the aspects and the external relations of the phenomena of capitalism. The proletariat was then still a “class-in-itself”. But when it reached the second period of its practice, the period of conscious and organized economic and political struggles, the proletariat was able to comprehend the essence of capitalist society, the relations of exploitation between social classes and its own historical task; and it was able to do so because of its own practice and because of its experience of prolonged struggle, which Marx and Engels scientifically summed up in all its variety to create the theory of Marxism for the education of the proletariat. It was when that the proletariat became a “class-for-itself”.
Similarly with the Chinese people’s knowledge of imperialism. The first stage was one of superficial, perceptual knowledge, as shown in the indiscriminate anti-foreign struggles of the Movement of the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the Yi Ho Tuan Movement, and so on. It was only in the second stage that the Chinese people reached the stage of rational knowledge, saw the internal and external contradictions of imperialism and saw the essential truth that imperialism had allied itself with China’s comprador and feudal classes knowledge began about the time of the May 4th Movement of 1919.
Next, let us consider war. If those who lead a war lack experience of war, then at the initial stage they will not understand the profound laws pertaining to the directing of a specific war (such as our Agrarian Revolutionary War of the past decade). At the initial stage they will merely experience a good deal of fighting and, what is more, suffer many defeats. But this experience (the experience of battles won and especially of battles lost) enables them to comprehend the inner thread of the whole war, namely, the laws of that specific war, to understand its strategy and tactics, and consequently to direct the war with confidence. If, at such a moment, the command is turned over to an inexperienced person, then he too will have to suffer a number of defeats (gain experience) before he can comprehend the true laws of the war.
“I am not sure I can handle it.” We often hear this remark when a comrade hesitates to accept an assignment. Why is he unsure of himself? Because he has no systematic understanding of the content and circumstances of the assignment, or because he has had little or no contact with such work, and so the laws governing it are beyond him. After a detailed analysis of the nature and circumstances of the assignment, he will feel more sure of himself and do it willingly. If he spends some time at the job and gains experience and if he is a person who is willing to look into matters with an open mind and not one who approaches problems subjectively, one-sidedly and superficially, then he can draw conclusions for himself as to how to go about the job and do it with much more courage. Only those who are subjective, one-sided and superficial in their approach to problems will smugly issue orders or directives the moment they arrive on the scene, without considering the circumstances, without viewing things in their totality (their history and their present state as a whole) and without getting to the essence of things (their nature and the internal relations between one thing and another). Such people are bound to trip and fall.
Thus it can be seen that the first step in the process of cognition is contact with the objects of the external world; this belongs to the stage of perception. The second step is to synthesize the data of perception by arranging and reconstructing them; this belongs to the stage of conception, judgement and inference. It is only when the data of perception are very rich (not fragmentary) and correspond to reality (are not illusory) that they can be the basis for forming correct concepts and theories.
Here two important points must be emphasized. The first, which has been stated before but should be repeated here, is the dependence of rational knowledge upon perceptual knowledge. Anyone who thinks that rational knowledge need not be derived from perceptual knowledge is an idealist. In the history of philosophy there is the “rationalist” school that admits the reality only of reason and not of experience, believing that reason alone is reliable while perceptual experience is not; this school errs by turning things upside down. The rational is reliable precisely because it has its source in sense perceptions, otherwise it would be like water without a source, a tree without roots, subjective, self-engendered and unreliable. As to the sequence in the significance of social practice in the process of cognition precisely because social practice alone can give rise to human knowledge and it alone can start man on the acquisition of perceptual experience from the objective world. For a person who shuts his eyes, stops his ears and totally cuts himself off from the objective world there can be no such thing as knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience—this is the materialism of the theory of knowledge.
The second point is that knowledge needs to be deepened, that the perceptual stage of knowledge needs to be developed to the rational stage—this the dialectics of the theory of knowledge. To think that knowledge can stop at the lower, perceptual stage and that perceptual knowledge alone is reliable while rational knowledge is not, would be to repeat the historical error of “empiricism”. This theory errs in failing to understand that, although the data of perception reflect certain realities in the objective world (I am not speaking here of idealist empiricism which confines experience to so-called introspection), they are merely one-sided and superficial, reflect a thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its inherent laws, it is necessary through the exercise of thought to reconstruct the rich data of sense perception, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the outside to the inside to the inside, in order to form a system of concepts and theories—it is necessary to make a leap from perceptual to rational knowledge. Such reconstructed knowledge is not more empty or more unreliable; on the contrary, whatever has been scientifically reconstructed in the process of cognition, on the basis of practice, reflects objective reality, as Lenin said, more deeply, more truly, more fully. As against this, vulgar “practical men” respect experience but despise theory, and therefore cannot have a comprehensive view of an entire objective process, lack clear direction and long-range perspective, and are complacent over occasional successes and glimpses of the truth. If such persons direct a revolution, they will lead it up a blind alley.
Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge—this is the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge. In philosophy, neither “rationalism” nor “empiricism” understands the historical or the dialectical nature of knowledge, and although each of these schools contains one aspect of the truth (here I am referring to materialist, not to idealist, rationalism and empiricism), both are wrong on the theory of knowledge as a whole. The dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational holds true for a minor process of cognition (for instance, knowing a single thing or task) as well as for a major process of cognition (for instance, knowing a whole society or a revolution).
But the movement of knowledge does not end here. If the dialectical-materialist movement of knowledge were to stop at rational knowledge, only half the problem would be dealt with. And as far as Marxist philosophy is concerned, only the less important half at that. Marxist philosophy holds that the most important problem does not lie in understanding the laws of the objective world and thus being able to explain it, but in applying the knowledge off these laws actively to change the world. From the Marxist viewpoint, theory is important, and its importance is fully expressed in Lenin’s statement, “Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement.” But Marxism emphasizes the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide action. If we have a correct theory but merely prate about it, pigeonhole it and do not put it into practice, then that theory, however good, is of no significance. Knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice and must then return to practice. The active function of knowledge manifests itself not only in the active leap from perceptual to rational knowledge, but—and this is more important—it must manifest itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge which grasps the laws of the world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the world, must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle and in the practice of scientific experiment. This is the process of testing and developing theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition. The problem of whether theory corresponds to objective reality is not, and cannot be, completely solved in the movement of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, mentioned above. The only way to solve this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory to practice and see whether it can achieve the objectives one has in mind. Many theories of natural science are held to be true not only because they were so considered when natural scientists originated them, but because they have been verified in subsequent scientific practice. Similarly, Marxism-Leninism is held to be true not only because it was so considered when it was scientifically formulated by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin but because it has been verified in the subsequent practice of revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle. Dialectical materialism is universally true because it is impossible for anyone to escape from its domain in his practice. The history of human knowledge tells us that the truth of many theories is incomplete and that this incompleteness is remedied through the test of practice. Many theories are erroneous and it is through the test of practice that their errors are corrected. That is why practice is the criterion of truth and why “the standpoint of life, of practice, should be first and fundamental in theory of knowledge”. Stalin has well said, “Theory becomes purposeless if it is not connected with revolutionary practice, just as practice gropes in the dark if its path is not illumined by revolutionary theory.”
When we get to this point, is the movement of knowledge completed? Our answer is: it is and yet it is not. When men is society throw themselves into the practice of changing a certain objective process (whether natural or social) at a certain stage of its development, they can, as a result of the reflection of the objective process in their brains and the exercise of their subjective activity, advance their knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, and create ideas, theories, plans or programmes which correspond in general to the laws of that objective process. They then apply these ideas, theories, plans or programmes in practice in the same objective process. And if they can realize the aims they have in mind, that is, if in that same process of practice they can translate, or on the whole translate, those previously formulated ideas, theories, plans or programmes into fact, then the movement of knowledge may be considered completed with regard to this particular process. In the process of changing nature, take for example the fulfillment of an engineering plan, the verification of a scientific hypothesis, the manufacture of an implement or the reaping of a crop; or in the process of changing society, take for example the victory of a strike, victory in a war or the fulfillment of an educational plan. All these may be considered the realization of aims one has in mind. But generally speaking, whether in the practice of changing nature or of changing society, men’s original ideas, theories, plans or programmes are seldom realized without any alteration. This is because people engaged in changing reality are usually subject to numerous limitations; they are limited not only by the development of the objective process itself and the degree to which this process has become manifest (the aspects and the essence of the objective process have not yet been fully revealed). In such a situation, ideas, theories, plans or programmes are usually altered partially and sometimes even wholly, because of the discovery of unforeseen circumstances in the course of practice. That is to say, it does happen that the original ideas, theories, plans or programmes fail to correspond with reality either in whole or in part and are wholly or partially incorrect. In many instances, failures have to be repeated many times before errors in knowledge can be corrected and correspondence with the laws of the objective process achieved, and consequently before the subjective can be transformed into the objective, or in other words, before the anticipated results can be achieved in practice. But when that point is reached, no matter how, the movement of human knowledge regarding a certain objective process at a certain stage of its development may be considered completed.
However, so far as the progression of the concerned, the movement of human knowledge is not completed. Every process, whether in the realm of nature or of society, progresses and develops by reason of its internal contradiction and struggle, and the movement of human knowledge should also progress and develop along with it. As far as social movements are concerned, true revolutionary leaders must not only be good at correcting their ideas, theories, plans or programmes when errors are discovered, as has been indicated above; but when a certain objective process has already progressed and changed from one stage of development to another, they must also be good at making themselves and all their fellow-revolutionaries progress and change in their subjective knowledge along with it, that is to say, they must ensure that the proposed new revolutionary tasks and new working programmes correspond to the new changes in the situation. In a revolutionary period the situation changes very rapidly; if the knowledge of revolutionaries does not change rapidly in accordance with the changed situation, they will be unable to lead the revolution to victory.
It often happens, however, that thinking lags behind reality; this is because man’s cognition is limited by numerous social conditions. We are opposed to die-hards in the revolutionary ranks whose thinking fails to advance with changing objective circumstances and has manifested itself historically as Right opportunism. These people fail to see that the struggle of opposites has already pushed the objective process forward while their knowledge has stopped at the old stage. This is characteristic of the thinking of all die-hards. Their thinking is divorced from social practice, and they cannot march ahead to guide the chariot of society; they simply trail behind, grumbling that it goes too fast and trying to drag it back or turn it in the opposite direction.
We are also opposed to “Left” phrase-mongering. The thinking of “Leftists” outstrips a given stage of development of the objective process; some regard their fantasies as truth, while others strain to realize in the present an ideal which can only be realized in the future. They alienate themselves from the current practice of the majority of the people and from the realities of the day, and show themselves adventurist in their actions.
Idealism and mechanical materialism, opportunism and adventurism, are all characterized by the breach between the subjective and the objective, by the separation of knowledge from practice. The Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, characterized as it is by scientific social practice, cannot but resolutely oppose these wrong ideologies. Marxists recognize that in the absolute and general process of development of the universe. The development of each particular process is relative, and that hence, in the endless flow of absolute truth, man’s knowledge of a particular process at any given stage of development is only relative truth. The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth. The development of an objective process is full of contradictions and struggles, and so is the development of the movement of human knowledge. All the dialectical movements of the objective world can sooner or later be reflected in human knowledge. In social practice, the process of coming into being, developing and passing away is infinite, and so is the process of coming into being, developing and passing away in human knowledge. As man’s practice which changes objective reality in accordance with given ideas, theories, plans or programmes, advances further and further, his knowledge of objective reality likewise becomes deeper and deeper. The movement of change in the world of objective reality is never-ending and so is man’s cognition of truth through practice. Marxism-Leninism has in no way exhausted truth but ceaselessly opens up roads to the knowledge of truth in the course of practice. Our conclusion is the concrete, historical unity of the subjective and the objective, of theory and practice, of knowing and doing, and we are opposed to all erroneous ideologies, whether “Left” or “Right”, which depart from concrete history.
In the present epoch of the development of society, the responsibility of correctly knowing and changing the world has been placed by history upon the shoulders of the proletariat and its party. This process, the practice of changing the world, which is determined in accordance with scientific knowledge, has already reached a historic moment in the world and in China, a great moment unprecedented in human history, that is, the moment for completely banishing darkness from the world and from China and for changing the world into a world of light such as never previously existed. The struggle of the proletariat and the revolutionary people to change the world comprises the fulfillment of the following tasks: to change the objective world and, at the same time, their own subjective world—to change their cognitive ability and change the relations between the subjective and the objective world. Such a change has already come about in one part of the globe, in the Soviet Union. There the people are pushing forward this process of change. The people of China and the rest of the world either are going through, or will go through, such a process. And the objective world which is to be changed also includes all the opponents of change, who, in order to be changed, must go through a stage of compulsion before they can enter the stage of voluntary, conscious change. The epoch of world communism will be reached when all mankind voluntarily and consciously changes itself and the world.
Discover the truth through practice, and again through practice verify and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing.
Notes: There used to be a number of comrades in our Party who were dogmatists and who for a long period rejected the experience of the Chinese revolution, denying the truth that “Marxism is not a dogma but a guide to action” and overawing people with words and phrases from Marxist works, torn out of context. There were also a number of comrades who were empiricists and who for a long period restricted themselves to their own fragmentary experience and did not understand the importance of theory for revolutionary practice or see the revolution as a whole, but worked blindly though industriously. The erroneous ideas of these two types of comrades, and particularly of the dogmatists, caused enormous losses to the Chinese revolution during 1931-34, and yet the dogmatists, cloaking themselves as Marxists, confused a great many comrades. “On Practice” was written in order to expose the subjectivist errors of dogmatism and empiricism in the Party, and especially the error of dogmatism, from the standpoint of the Marxist theory of knowledge. It was entitled “On Practice” because its stress was on exposing the dogmatist kind of subjectivism, which belittles practice. The ideas contained in this essay were presented by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in a lecture at the Anti-Japanese Military and Political College in Yenan.
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